Reference Library

A January 2022 report by the White House OSTP/NSTC Research Security Subcommittee providing additional details on 1.) Disclosure Requirements and Standardization 2.) Persistent Identifiers 3.) Consequences for Violation of Disclosure Requirements 4.) Information Sharing and 5.) Research Security Programs. Largely superseded by the final July 9, 2024 guidelines.

Issued by the NCSC in December 2021, this document includes links to risk mitigation materials that can be utilized to improve: physical security, personnel security, operations security, cybersecurity, defensive counterintelligence, insider threat mitigation, and supply chain risk management.

November 2021 guidelines for the Australian University sector to help manage and engage with risk to deepen resilience against foreign interference in the university sector.

A May 2021 joint release from AAU and APLU highlighting key principles that can be adapted by both universities and the federal government to protect the research enterprise from foreign influence.

Published April 2021, Japan's policy directions for ensuring research integrity in response to new risks associated with increasing internationalization and openness of research activities.

Issued March 2021. Requires immediate notification of undisclosed Other Support. If a recipient discovers Other Support information on an active NIH grant that should have been, but was not, disclosed during just-in-time or in an annual progress report, updated Other Support must be submitted to the Grants Management Specialist as soon as the undisclosed information is known.

A Presidential Memorandum issued in January 2021 to strengthen protections of U.S. Government-supported R&D against foreign government interference and exploitation. It focuses on ensuring full disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and commitment by recipients of federal R&D and requires research institutions receiving over $50 million in federal R&D funding to certify they operate a research security program covering cybersecurity, foreign travel security, insider threat awareness, and export control training. As of November 2025, federal agencies continue to coordinate and work to implement this requirement for awardee institutions.

A supplement to NSPM-33 outlining recommendations for research organizations to enhance research security and integrity. Categories include: Demonstrate organizational leadership and oversight; Establish an expectation of openness and transparency; Provide and share training, support, and information; Ensure effective mechanisms for compliance with organizational policies; and Manage potential risks associated with collaborations and data.

A May 2020 joint release from AAU and APLU providing effective practices that can be utilized by universities to implement research security efforts and minimize foreign influence.

Signed January 3, 2020. Section 223 mandates disclosure of funding sources in applications for federal R&D awards and holds universities accountable for ensuring faculty awareness. Section 1299C is an amendment to FY 2019 NDAA Section 1286 requiring designation of an official responsible for liaising with academic institutions and briefing them on espionage risks. Section 1062 restricts DoD and NSF funds to institutions hosting a Confucius Institute. Section 9907 prohibits any funds for microelectronics initiatives to a foreign entity of concern.

NSF's formal response to the JASON Group's report on Fundamental Research Security, outlining how the Foundation plans to address the report's findings and recommendations.

Published in 2020. Purpose is to aid universities in assessing collaborations and the best approach to international collaboration.

Signed December 20, 2019. Section 1746 directs OSTP to establish an interagency working group (the Research Security Subcommittee) under the NSTC to protect federally funded R&D from foreign interference, cyberattacks, theft, or espionage and to develop recommendations for best practices for federal agencies and grantee institutions. Section 1746 also called on the National Academy of Science, Engineering and Medicine to stand up a new Roundtable on Science, Technology, and Security. Includes Confucius Institute waiver criteria for DoD.

A December 2019 report from the JASON Group commissioned by NSF. The report outlines that concerns of foreign influence can be addressed within the framework of research integrity and, in addition, that the benefits of openness in research and of the inclusion of foreign researchers dictate against measures that would restrict fundamental research. The report includes questions for researchers to consider when entering a collaboration [Section 7.3 Assessment Tools: pages 34-36].

Issued July 10, 2019. Reminds institutions receiving NIH funding of the requirement for researchers to disclose all sources of support for their research endeavors, regardless of the source, value, or whether monetary or in-kind, and to disclose all scientific appointments and positions, whether foreign or domestic, paid or unpaid, etc. The notice also reminds the extramural community of the requirement to comply with HHS regulations regarding Financial Conflicts of Interest, as well as the requirement to report all Foreign Components involved in NIH-supported activities.

A searchable database that provides ratings on 'risk' for collaboration with an entity. In addition to the tracker, an associated document (released in 2019): Exploring the military and security links of China's universities.

A reference (2019) that can be utilized for advice and guidance which supports the integrity of the system of international research collaboration.

Signed into law July 26, 2018. Section 1286 directs the Secretary of Defense to establish an initiative to work with IHEs who perform defense research and engineering activities and name an academic liaison. It also directed DoD to publish a list of institutions and foreign talent recruitment programs that have perpetuated malicious activities or that operate under the direction of the military forces or the intelligence agency of the applicable country and thus pose a threat to national security. The resulting list is updated annually.

The 'Wolf Amendment' (2011) prohibits participation, collaboration, or coordination bilaterally with China or any Chinese-owned company on any NASA project at the prime or subrecipient level. NASA clarified in a September 2022 presentation that the agency defines a 'Chinese-owned company' as any company owned by China, or any company incorporated under the laws of China, and that Chinese universities and similar institutions are considered to be incorporated under the laws of China and therefore the funding restrictions apply.

A foundational federal document from September 1985 issued by the Office of the President that outlined a national policy of openness in federally-funded fundamental research, including the fundamental research exclusion.