A March 2024 report commissioned by NSF and issued by the JASON group. Recommends NSF adopt a dynamic approach for identifying potentially sensitive research topics as they arise and weigh the balance between the protective benefits and the unintended negative consequences of controls on sensitive research. It is suggested that the identification of sensitive projects proposed to NSF occurs most naturally before peer or panel review. Specific mitigation strategies for sensitive research projects should be negotiated and agreed upon by the principal investigator (PI), NSF, and the institution and be proportionate to the assessed risk, relative to the associated costs.
Issued by the White House OSTP in February 2024, this policy requires federal agencies to use the Common Forms for current and pending support and biosketches, noting that NSF will serve as steward. Deviation from the common disclosure forms will require Office of Management and Budget (OMB)/Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review and clearance under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).
Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies, NSTC|
ActiveFederal
A February 2024 biannual update from the Fast Track Action Subcommittee on Critical and Emerging Technologies of the NSTC that defines critical and emerging technologies (CETs), which are a subset of advanced technologies that have a significant impact on U.S. national security. [List of CETs is outlined on pages 8-11]
A congressional hearing held in February 2024 with representatives from the White House (OSTP), NSF, NIH, and DoE examining federal science agency actions to secure the U.S. science and technology enterprise.
Per Section 10631 of the CHIPS and Science Act, this document issued in February 2024 from the White House OSTP provides definitions of both foreign talent recruitment programs (FTRPs) and malign foreign talent recruitment programs (MFTRPs) [pages 4-6] and what is not considered an FTRP. A foreign talent recruitment program is any program, position, or activity that includes compensation in the form of cash, in-kind compensation, including research funding, promised future compensation, complimentary foreign travel, things of non de minimis value, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, or other types of remuneration or consideration directly provided by a foreign country at any level or their designee, or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country.
An updated one-hour condensed and consolidated federal research security training module offered by the SECURE Center. NSF, NIH, DoD, DOE, and USDA have indicated that the condensed module meets their research security requirements. The SCORM files (for upload in the institution's learning management systems), Storyline file, and transcript can also be found on the website. The training includes two, four or six editable html-based files that can be modified to supply institution-specific contact information and links to resources. A preview version can be viewed on the website and a version that offers a certificate of completion is now available.
University of Michigan (with Ohio State University, Stanford University, and Duke University)|
ActiveFederal
A condensed and consolidated one-hour version of the four federal training modules developed by the University of Michigan in collaboration with Ohio State University, Stanford University, and Duke University. Other academic institutions or organizations can download for their use. The training includes two editable html-based files that can be modified to supply institution-specific contact information and links to resources. SCORM files, Storyline file, and written version of the narrative are available.
A summary document from AAU, updated in January 2024, that references key federal documentation that has been developed to address foreign influence in research.
National Academies: Sciences, Engineering and Medicine|
ActiveFederal
A 2024 report by the National Academies: Sciences, Engineering and Medicine examining international talent programs in the context of the changing global environment.
The common form for federal-wide biographical sketch disclosure, created as directed by NSPM-33 with NSF serving as steward. Includes certification by each senior/key person at the time of submission that they are not a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program as defined in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. As of November 2025, the form has been implemented by NSF and NASA.
The common form for federal-wide use for current and pending (other) support disclosure, created as directed by NSPM-33 with NSF serving as steward. The form includes certification by each senior/key person at the time of submission that they are not a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program as defined in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. As of November 2025, the form has been implemented by NSF and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
A November 2023 supplement to the NSPM-33 Implementation Guidance that provides definitions of terms used throughout the guidance and related policy documents.
RTES presented on research security risk reviews during a COGR meeting in October 2023, noting that much of the agency's portfolio includes critical and emerging technologies. Among the areas noted as potential targets were Advanced batteries, Advanced computing, Advanced engineering materials, Advanced manufacturing, Artificial intelligence/machine learning, Autonomous systems and robotics, Biotechnologies, Quantum information technologies, Next generation renewable energy generation and storage and Semiconductors and microelectronics.
Published August 2023 by NIST, this report integrates several U.S. government policies and guidelines to develop a framework for an integrated, risk-balanced approach for safeguarding international science and technology from undue foreign interference.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)|
DraftNIST
An initial public draft issued by NIST in August 2023 that summarizes feedback NIST received on institutions of higher education (IHE) cybersecurity challenges and includes resources and possible next steps. Per the final research security program guidelines published July 9, 2024, institutions are to implement a cybersecurity program one year after publication of the final version of this NIST cybersecurity resource. Federal research funding agencies, working with NIST and IHEs via the Federal Demonstration Partnership (FDP), are currently developing cybersecurity guidelines that align with NIST 8481 for use in RSPs.
Issued June 29, 2023 by DoD. The document includes: 1. A Policy on Risk-based Security Reviews of Fundamental Research, 2. A Decision Matrix to Inform Fundamental Research Proposal Mitigation (Amended May 5, 2025), 3. A list of foreign institutions identified as engaging in problematic activity (Part 3, Table 1, Amended June 24, 2025), and 4. A list of foreign talent recruitment programs identified as posing a threat to U.S. national security interests (Part 3, Table 2). The Decision Matrix contains four factors for assessing senior/key personnel disclosures: a. Participation in foreign talent recruitment programs, b. Current or prior funding from foreign countries of concern (FCOCs), c. Filing a patent in an FCOC or on behalf of an FCOC-connected entity without disclosure, and d. Associations or affiliations with organizations on U.S. Entity (trade restriction) and other indicated (U.S. restricted) lists.
A June 2023 report issued by the National Academies providing recommendations that U.S. institutions of higher education can take to identify and mitigate risks associated with foreign-funded language and culture institutes on campus.