A summary document issued by COGR in January 2022 that highlights key points of the Guidance for Implementing NSPM-33 Provisions.
Disclosure Requirements
Biosketches, Current & Pending (Other) Support, common forms, what must be disclosed and when.
39 references in this topic
Federal-wide Baseline
A Presidential Memorandum issued in January 2021 to strengthen protections of U.S. Government-supported R&D against foreign government interference and exploitation. It focuses on ensuring full disclosure of potential conflicts of interest and commitment by recipients of federal R&D and requires research institutions receiving over $50 million in federal R&D funding to certify they operate a research security program covering cybersecurity, foreign travel security, insider threat awareness, and export control training. As of November 2025, federal agencies continue to coordinate and work to implement this requirement for awardee institutions.
A supplement to NSPM-33 outlining recommendations for research organizations to enhance research security and integrity. Categories include: Demonstrate organizational leadership and oversight; Establish an expectation of openness and transparency; Provide and share training, support, and information; Ensure effective mechanisms for compliance with organizational policies; and Manage potential risks associated with collaborations and data.
A January 2022 report by the White House OSTP/NSTC Research Security Subcommittee providing additional details on 1.) Disclosure Requirements and Standardization 2.) Persistent Identifiers 3.) Consequences for Violation of Disclosure Requirements 4.) Information Sharing and 5.) Research Security Programs. Largely superseded by the final July 9, 2024 guidelines.
The common form for federal-wide use for current and pending (other) support disclosure, created as directed by NSPM-33 with NSF serving as steward. The form includes certification by each senior/key person at the time of submission that they are not a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program as defined in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. As of November 2025, the form has been implemented by NSF and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).
The common form for federal-wide biographical sketch disclosure, created as directed by NSPM-33 with NSF serving as steward. Includes certification by each senior/key person at the time of submission that they are not a party to a malign foreign talent recruitment program as defined in the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. As of November 2025, the form has been implemented by NSF and NASA.
A November 2023 supplement to the NSPM-33 Implementation Guidance that provides definitions of terms used throughout the guidance and related policy documents.
A matrix developed to assist in determining if specific activities are required to be disclosed and what form is appropriate for reporting. Last updated May 2024.
Issued by the White House OSTP in February 2024, this policy requires federal agencies to use the Common Forms for current and pending support and biosketches, noting that NSF will serve as steward. Deviation from the common disclosure forms will require Office of Management and Budget (OMB)/Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) review and clearance under the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).
Research security training developed by institutions and organizations under cooperative agreements funded by NSF in collaboration with the National Institutes of Health (NIH), Department of Energy (DoE), and Department of Defense (DoD), with engagement from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The training consists of 4 modules: 1.) What is Research Security?; 2.) Disclosure; 3.) Manage and Mitigate Risk; 4.) International Collaboration.
Per Section 10631 of the CHIPS and Science Act, this document issued in February 2024 from the White House OSTP provides definitions of both foreign talent recruitment programs (FTRPs) and malign foreign talent recruitment programs (MFTRPs) [pages 4-6] and what is not considered an FTRP. A foreign talent recruitment program is any program, position, or activity that includes compensation in the form of cash, in-kind compensation, including research funding, promised future compensation, complimentary foreign travel, things of non de minimis value, honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, or other types of remuneration or consideration directly provided by a foreign country at any level or their designee, or an entity based in, funded by, or affiliated with a foreign country.
OSTP to issue guidance to Federal research agencies to prohibit participation in 'foreign talent recruitment programs' by agency personnel and provide additional clarification to the research community regarding which activities are considered 'foreign talent recruitment programs.' OSTP is also directed to issue guidance clarifying that researchers working on Federally supported research projects must disclose participation in FTRPs in Federal research award proposals. OSTP is further directed to issue guidance for Federal research agencies to prohibit researchers working on agency-funded projects from participating in 'malign foreign talent recruitment programs,' and certify both at the time of proposal and annually that they are not part of a malign foreign talent recruitment program.
A matrix that lists policies and requirements under the headings of: Disclosures, Agency Risk Assessment, FCOI & COC, Training, Certifications, and Research Security Program for each federal agency. Per COGR, this tool is frequently updated to reflect the release of new documentation. Updated September 30, 2025.
A chart that compares federal laws, regulations, and policies in the area of science and security. The chart is divided into three separate tabs that cover (a) major federal-wide legislation or policy, (b) agency disclosure requirements for researchers and research institutions; and (c) agency conflict of interest policies. Updated September 30, 2025.
Signed January 3, 2020. Section 223 mandates disclosure of funding sources in applications for federal R&D awards and holds universities accountable for ensuring faculty awareness. Section 1299C is an amendment to FY 2019 NDAA Section 1286 requiring designation of an official responsible for liaising with academic institutions and briefing them on espionage risks. Section 1062 restricts DoD and NSF funds to institutions hosting a Confucius Institute. Section 9907 prohibits any funds for microelectronics initiatives to a foreign entity of concern.
Signed into law in August 2022, the CHIPS and Science Act includes a number of research security provisions. Key sections address research security at DOE, NIST cybersecurity guidance, NSF Office of Research Security and Policy, research security training requirements, information sharing analysis organizations, Confucius Institute restrictions, foreign financial support reporting, and foreign talent recruitment program requirements.
September 2022. Requires agencies to implement a due diligence program to assess security risks for SBIR and STTR proposals. Disclosure requirements include information on foreign ties, business relationships, investment, and ownership. [Source: AAU, January 2024].
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a report on May 20, 2025, summarizing federal research security policy efforts to date, and providing options Congress might consider to address perceived gaps or deficiencies while also remaining cognizant of the potential increase to administrative burden they would present. Proposed options discussed include: a. Expanding sources of foreign support researchers are required to disclose, b. Broadening the scope of who is required to disclose Current and Pending (Other) Support, c. Increasing the frequency of post-award updates, d. Expanding agency requirements when reviewing disclosed information, e. Focusing risk assessment activities more narrowly on critical and emerging technologies, f. Expanding agencies' requirements to report to congress on research security violations, mitigation measures, and implementation status.
Published September 3, 2025, a National Academies Committee conducted an expedited study to examine federal research regulations and identify ways to improve regulatory processes and administrative tasks, reduce or eliminate unnecessary work, and modify and remove policies and regulations that have outlived their purpose while maintaining necessary and appropriate integrity, accountability, and oversight. Research security specific options include: implement the NSPM-33 common disclosure forms and disclosure table without deviation; establish common principles for agency research security risk reviews for fundamental research; continue prior efforts to streamline and clarify export controls; and adapt cybersecurity requirements for university settings.